We examine a technology adoption game with network e¤ects in which coordination on technology A and technology B constitute a Nash equilibrium. Coordination on technology B is assumed to be payo¤-dominant. We de…ne a technology's critical mass as the minimum share of users necessary to make the choice of this technology a best response for any remaining user. We show that the technology with a lower critical mass is risk-dominant and is chosen by the maximin criterion. We present experimental evidence that both payo¤ dominance and risk dominance explain participants'choices. The relative riskiness of a technology can be proxied using technologies'critical masses or stand-alone values.
Introduction
In many parts of modern economies (e.g., in information and communications) the payo¤ associated with a particular technology (or product) depends positively on the total number of users choosing the same technology. The emergence of positive network e¤ects (i.e., demandside economies of scale) typically depends on user preferences for compatibility (see Shapiro and Varian, 1998; Farrell and Klemperer, 2007) . Technologies may be di¤erentiated, but its importance for users'adoption decisions is often negligible when compared with their preference for compatible technologies.
A characteristic feature of markets with positive network e¤ects is that users (which can be consumers or …rms) typically face several incompatible technologies (so-called "standards") when making their purchasing decisions. 1 It is well-known that simultaneous user choices between incompatible technologies that exhibit pronounced network e¤ects give rise to multiple equilibria (see, Farrell and Saloner, 1985 ; Katz and Shapiro, 1985) . Users, therefore, face a coordination problem which involves so-called strategic uncertainty as it is not clear which equilibrium should be expected. 2 There are numerous stories of "market failures"in the presence of network e¤ects when users fail to coordinate on the allegedly superior technology. To mention one prominent example, the Qwerty keyboard standard has been proscribed as inferior to the rival standard Dvorak (see David, 1985) . 3 David argues that network e¤ects play an important role for understanding the emergence of so-called "Qwerty worlds," in which users persistently select inferior technologies. 1 Examples of rivalry between incompatible technologies include the VCR standards battle between VHS sponsored by JVC and Beta sponsored by Sony (see, Cusumano et al., 1992 ) and the coexistence of di¤erent standards in wireless telephone networks (namely, CDMA, TDMA and GSM) in the United States (see Gandal and Salant, 2003) . 2 We follow Harsanyi and Selten (1988) and Van Huyck et al. (1990 , 1991 who use the term strategic uncertainty to describe uncertainty players are facing when they have more than one equilibrium strategy. See Burton and Sefton (2004) for another approach. They analyze experimentally how strategic uncertainty a¤ects participants' choices of their equilibrium strategies. Under strategic uncertainty they understand a player's uncertainty about the other player's choice among all possible strategies including non-equilibrium strategies. Harsanyi and Selten (1988) develop the concept of risk dominance as a re…nement criterion in games with multiple Nash equilibria. In short, that theory selects the Nash equilibrium in which players choose less risky strategies. Intuitively, a strategy tends to be less risky if it secures a relatively high payo¤ independently of the choices of the other players. In a coordination game with two Nash equilibria -one being payo¤-dominant-the concept of risk dominance may help to predict actual outcomes. If a payo¤-dominant Nash equilibrium is also risk-dominant, then the concept of risk dominance is reassuring. If, however, the opposite is true, i.e., one Nash equilibrium is payo¤-dominant while the other one is risk-dominant, then a trade-o¤ emerges which may imply coordination failure (when players coordinate on the inferior risk-dominant equilibrium) or disequilibrium outcomes (when players fail to coordinate).
In this paper we o¤er experimental evidence on how the players resolve the trade-o¤ between risk dominance and payo¤ dominance in the presence of network e¤ects. 4 We introduce a technology adoption game where N 2 users choose simultaneously one of two technologies, A or B, that both exhibit positive network e¤ects. The utility of adopting one of the technologies is the sum of the stand-alone value plus the network value which is linearly increasing in the number of users of the same technology. We restrict parameters of the game in a way that coordination of all users on either technology is a Nash equilibrium, while coordination on B is the payo¤-dominant equilibrium. 5 We introduce the concept of a "critical mass," which we de…ne as the minimum share of 4 There is no experimental evidence on the trade-o¤ between payo¤ dominance and risk dominance in a setting of competing technologies each giving rise to positive network e¤ects. Yet, there are several experimental studies on coordination games which are related to our study. Cooper et al. (1990) report coordination failure in their experiments on coordination games as participants largely fail to coordinate on the payo¤-dominant equilibrium.
While the authors do not analyze explicitly the in ‡uence of riskiness, it is possible that the trade-o¤ between payo¤ dominance and risk dominance was responsible for the observed pattern. Van Huyck et al. (1990 , 1991 report from their coordination game experiments that in case of a trade-o¤ between payo¤ dominance and security (which chooses a strategy yielding the highest minimal payo¤) disequilibrium outcomes prevail in the …rst period (which can be considered as a proxy for a one-shot game). Straub (1995) concludes from his experiment on repeated coordination games that coordination failure appears to result from a trade-o¤ between payo¤ dominance and risk dominance. 5 In that sense, technology B is the superior one, while technology A is inferior.
3 users necessary to make the choice of a technology a best response for any remaining user. 6, 7 Intuitively, a technology with a lower (larger) critical mass is less (more) risky as it requires less users to coordinate implying a lower level of strategic uncertainty. We show that the critical mass concept is closely related to the risk dominance re…nement and the maximin criterion; i.e., a technology is chosen by both the risk dominance and the maximin criterion if and only if the technology has the smaller critical mass.
We present the results of an experiment where participants play the technology adoption game for di¤erent parameter constellations. In all the versions of the game coordination on technology A constitutes the risk-dominant equilibrium, while coordination on technology B constitutes the payo¤-dominant equilibrium. Our main results are the following: i) both payo¤ dominance and risk dominance explain participants'choices (giving rise to disequilibrium outcomes), ii) the relative riskiness of a technology can be proxied by using the di¤erence in critical masses or the di¤erence in stand-alone values. 8 More precisely, we …nd that i) an increase in B's relative payo¤ dominance (proxied by the relative di¤erence in maximal payo¤s) increases the number of B-choices, and ii) an increase in the relative riskiness of technology B (proxied either by the relative di¤erence in critical masses or stand-alone values) reduces the number of B-choices.
Our paper is closely related to Heinemann et al. (2009) . They analyze experimentally a critical mass coordination game where N 2 players choose between a safe and a risky strategy.
The safe strategy delivers a constant payo¤ irrespectively of the other players' choices. The payo¤ of the risky strategy depends on the choices of the other players such that at least K players have to choose it to deliver a higher payo¤ than the safe payo¤. If less than K players choose the risky strategy, then the payo¤ is zero. Heinemann et al. introduce the coordination 6 It is well-known that markets with network e¤ects exhibit a "critical mass" e¤ect (see, for instance, Rohlfs, 1974; Economides, 1996; . 7 Liebowitz and Margolis (1996) also point out the importance of the critical mass in their illustrative analysis of consumers'choices between di¤erent standards. Besides several di¤erences, our analysis gives theoretical support to their approach based on the risk dominance criterion. 8 Note that a Nash equilibrium is either risk-dominant or not. In that sense, the risk dominance concept does not take account of gradual changes of the riskiness of equilibrium play. Interpreting the risk dominance criterion in terms of the critical mass allows us to transform a binary criterion into a continuous measure. The latter is important for the empirical analysis of our experimental data. 4 requirement k := (K 1)=(N 1) to proxy the coordination problem players are facing when choosing the risky strategy. The results of the experimental analysis reveal that the number of participants choosing the risky strategy becomes smaller when the coordination requirement increases. A similar relationship is shown regarding an increase of the safe payo¤.
Given Heinemann et al., our main contribution is to consider a game where both strategies are risky; i.e., payo¤s always depend on the choices of the other players. When both strategies are risky, then our critical mass concept allows to proxy the strategies'relative riskiness. Finally, we analyze the in ‡uence of the minimum payo¤s (given by technologies'stand-alone values) on participants'choices in the experiment. Schmidt et al. (2003) is an experimental study which examined the in ‡uence of changes in payo¤ and risk dominance on participants'choices in a coordination game. Their main …nding is that only changes in risk dominance helped to explain the observed data. We contribute to their analysis by proposing di¤erent proxies for risk dominance based on the technologies' critical masses and/or their minimal payo¤s. 9 Most importantly, we show that both the proxies for risk and payo¤ dominance are explaining participants'behavior in our one-shot coordination game.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the technology adoption game and we de…ne the critical mass concept. Section 3 shows how the concept of the critical mass relates to the risk dominance re…nement and the maximin criterion. Section 4 presents the design of the experiment and Section 5 reports the experimental results. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
The Technology Adoption Game
Suppose N 2 identical and discrete users (which can be consumers or …rms) make simultaneously their choices between two technologies, A and B. The payo¤ a user derives from technology i = A; B depends positively on the total number of users choosing the same technology, N i N , and is given by
The parameter i 0 can be interpreted as the "stand-alone value" a user derives from technology i absent any network e¤ects. The term i (N i 1) measures positive network e¤ects if 9 Our proxy for payo¤ dominance is same as in their analysis.
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N i > 1 users choose the same technology i. 10 The coe¢ cient i 0 measures the (constant) slope of the network e¤ects function of technology i. Users always …nd it optimal to adopt one of the technologies, so that N A + N B = N holds.
The game is parameterized such that it has two strong Nash equilibria in pure strategies in which either all users choose technology A (A-equilibrium) or all users choose technology B (B-equilibrium). 11 The B-equilibrium is supposed to be payo¤-dominant. We summarize the corresponding parameter restrictions as follows.
Assumption 1. We invoke the following parameter restrictions:
, for i; j = A; B and i 6 = j.
The proof of the next proposition shows that part i) of Assumption 1 ensures that there are two (strong) Nash equilibria in pure strategies (A-and B-equilibrium), so that users face a coordination game. Part ii) implies that the B-equilibrium is payo¤-dominant. 12 Proposition 1. The technology adoption game has exactly two (strong) Nash equilibria in pure strategies, the A-and the B-equilibrium.
Proof. An equilibrium in which users coordinate on technology i is a strong equilibrium if and
together with the former inequalities implies
From this it follows that U B (N B ) > U B (N B + 1). Obviously, this is not consistent with (1).
Hence, the condition A (N 1) < A B < B (N 1) assures that there are only two Nash equilibria in pure strategies; namely, the A-equilibrium and the B-equilibrium. Q.E.D.
1 0 We assume that users do not create network e¤ects for themselves.
1 1 A Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies) is strong if each player has a unique (pure strategy) best response to his rivals'equilibrium strategies (see Harsanyi, 1973 
with i; j = A; B and i 6 = j. It holds that m A = 1 m B and m i 2 (0; 1). Moreover, @m i =@ i < 0,
Proof. Consider the decision problem of a single user. Assume that e N other users choose technology i. If choosing technology i constitutes a best response for a user under the assumption that all other, N e N 1, users choose technology j 6 = i, then it also constitutes a best response in all other cases (when less than N e N 1 users choose technology j). Hence, it must hold
The minimal value of e N , which satis…es Inequality (3), e N min , is given by 13
Given part i) of Assumption 1 it holds that
Thus, m i is given by
Adding up critical masses of technologies A and B, we get m A + m B = 1. From (4) and (5) it follows that m i 2 (0; 1). The signs of the derivatives @m i =@ i < 0, @m i =@ i < 0 and @m i =@ j > 0 are straightforward, while 
The notion of the critical mass is an intuitive proxy of a technology's riskiness. When the critical mass decreases, then its choice becomes less risky in the sense that fewer adopters are needed to make the choice of this technology a best reply for any remaining user. Conversely, a large critical mass implies that a relatively large portion of users is needed to induce others to follow for sure; with the implication that a large degree of strategic uncertainty exists.
The problem of multiple Nash equilibria in games has inspired a large literature; one mainly dealing with improving the theoretical prediction of equilibrium play and another strand of works using experimental methods to explore players' behavior. In a coordination game, the Nash equilibrium concept does not yield a unique prediction for players' behavior. The lack of theoretical precision is mirrored in experimental studies which often conclude that Nash equilibrium predictions perform poorly in games with multiple equilibria. 14 We next show the close relationship between the critical mass concept, the risk dominance re…nement, and the maximin criterion. Risk dominance. To …nd the risk-dominant equilibrium, we apply the tracing procedure as proposed by Harsanyi and Selten (1988) . 15, 16 The tracing procedure describes a process of converging expectations from the priors to the expectations implying one of the Nash equilibria;
the so-called risk-dominant equilibrium. This procedure starts from the priors for every user l = 1; 2; :::; N , which characterize the prior expectations of all other users about the probabilities with which user l chooses his pure strategies (technology A and technology B). 17 To …nd the priors we follow the three assumptions proposed by Harsanyi and Selten. First, a user l expects that either all other users choose technology B (with probability q l ) or all other users choose technology A (with a counter probability 1 q l ). Second, a user plays a best response to his expectations. And third, it is assumed that expectations q l are independently distributed random variables and each of them has a uniform distribution over the unit interval. The tracing procedure consists then in …nding a feasible path from the equilibrium in the starting point given by the priors to the equilibrium in the end point given by the original game. The equilibrium in the end point constitutes the risk-dominant equilibrium. The next proposition de…nes the 1 5 The risk dominance criterion is a re…nement of the Nash equilibrium concept. It picks the equilibrium which is chosen by the tracing procedure. In the case of 2 2 games the risk-dominant equilibrium satis…es three axioms:
invariance with respect to isomorphism, best-reply invariance, and payo¤ monotonicity.
1 6 The tracing procedure extends the Bayesian approach from one-person to n-player decision problems. The Bayesian approach is motivated by the uncertainty about the choices of the other players. At the beginning of the tracing procedure every player expects all other players to act according to some priors (prior distributions over a player's pure strategies). However, these expectations are not self-ful…lling and, hence, have to be adjusted. In each step of the tracing procedure the role of the prior expectations decreases. In each step every player plays a best response given his expectations. The tracing procedure consists then in …nding a feasible path from the prior expectations to the expectations, which correspond to one of the Nash equilibria. That equilibrium is then called risk-dominant equilibrium. Expectations at the end of the tracing procedure are ful…lled as the risk-dominant equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium.
1 7 At the beginning of the tracing procedure every player assigns a certain probability to the hypothesis that a given player will actually use his pure strategy. The combination of these probabilities for a given player constitutes the expected (prior) probability distribution over the pure strategies of that player or, prior. Any player forms such priors for all other players. Harsanyi and Selten (1988) assume that all other players associate the same prior probability distribution with a given player. 
Following Harsanyi and Selten's second assumption, we derive from (7) user l's best response to his beliefs: play A if q l < e q and play B if q l > e q. The third assumption states that q l is uniformly distributed over the interval [0; 1]. Hence, the probability that q l < e q is e q and the probability that q l > e q is 1 e q, which holds for any user l. Then, user l choose A with probability e q and chooses B with counter probability 1 e q. That constitutes the prior adopted by all the other users about user l's choices at the beginning of the tracing procedure. Given such a prior, the expected payo¤ of any user from choosing technology A is
Similarly, the expected payo¤ from choosing technology B is
Combining (8) and (9) we obtain that a user chooses B if and only if
holds, which is equivalent to
Comparing Condition (10) with the formula for m i stated in Lemma 1, it is obvious that Condition (10) holds if and only if m B < 1=2. From Condition (10) it is immediate that a user chooses A if and only if
If m B = 1=2, then a user is indi¤erent between choosing A or B from a risk dominance perspective. Conditions (10) and (11) characterize the equilibrium based on the priors: If (10) holds, then all users choose technology B, and they choose technology A if (11) holds. For the special case of our game we do not need to continue the tracing procedure further and can make use of Lemma 4.17.7 in Harsanyi and Selten (1988, p. 183 ). This Lemma states that the equilibrium of the game based on the priors is the outcome selected by the tracing procedure if the following conditions hold. First, the equilibrium must be a strong equilibrium point when each user behaves according to his prior beliefs, which is guaranteed for the B-equilibrium by Condition (10) and for the A-equilibrium by Condition (11) . Second, the equilibrium must also be an equilibrium of the original game, which holds according to Proposition 1. Hence, we obtain the result that technology i is risk-dominant if and only if m i < m j , for i; j = A; B and i 6 = j.
Q.E.D.
According to Proposition 2 the technology with a lower critical mass is risk-dominant. This result is intuitive as a larger critical mass implies that relatively more users are needed to make the adoption of the technology surely pro…table leading to a higher degree of strategic uncertainty. If technology B has a larger critical mass than technology A, then the risk dominance criterion requires to select technology A which is the payo¤-inferior equilibrium. 20 Maximin criterion. The maximin criterion selects the technology which delivers the max-imal payo¤ in the worst outcome. In the technology adoption game the worst outcome for a player is to be the only user of a technology. In that case, the payo¤ is given by the stand-alone value, i (i = A; B).
In the following Corollary we show how the maximin criterion relates to the critical mass concept.
Corollary 1. Whenever technology A has a lower critical mass, it is chosen by the maximin criterion.
Proof. Equilibrium B is payo¤-dominant, hence,
must hold. If equilibrium A has a lower critical mass, then according to Lemma 1 it is true that
Note that the RHS of Equation (13) 
Design of the Experiment
The experiment consists of 16 decision situations. Every decision situation is based on a particular speci…cation of the technology adoption game. In every decision situation, each of the 17 participants chooses between two alternatives: A and B. 21, 22 The payo¤s in each decision situation were presented in a table (see Appendix B for the tables of the 16 decision situations). 23 The payo¤s were given in …ctitious units.
2 1 The choice of a group with 17 participants is motivated by the necessity i) to have su¢ cient variation in the critical mass of the payo¤-dominant alternative while (N 1)mB is given by an integer, ii) to exclude negative payo¤s associated with alternative B, and iii) to have su¢ cient variation in the payo¤s of alternative A such that both alternatives yield su¢ ciently risky payo¤s (which depend strongly on the other participants'choices). If, for instance, we used the group size of N = 7, then (N 1)mB could only take two possible values: 6mB 2 f4; 5g, which gives too little variation. In contrast, in our experiment (N 1)mB takes four di¤erent values. The same variation could also be achieved if using the group size N = 11. However, we also had to consider the values of the critical mass, which are not very far away from 0:5. Otherwise, we i) could get negative payo¤s associated with alternative B (when NB is small) or ii) get a very ‡at payo¤ function for alternative A. The group size N = 17 allowed to have su¢ cient variation in alternative B's critical mass in the region not too close to 1.
2 2 To avoid that alternative A may be seen as focal by participants we re-labeled the alternatives in the decision situations presented to participants. An alternative could be labelled as either X or Y , di¤erently in di¤erent decision situations.
2 3 In the tables we rounded the payo¤s to the closest integer, if necessary. In Table 1 the critical mass of alternative B and the di¤erence in alternatives'minimal payo¤s. We increase the critical mass of alternative B (multiplied by 16) from 9 up to 12, so that within each block the relative riskiness of alternative B increases. Moreover, the di¤erence in alternatives'minimal payo¤s increases within each block. 24 We hypothesize that for a given relative payo¤ dominance of alternative B (proxied by d max ) the number of B-choices is lower the higher the critical mass of alternative B becomes. We expect the same relationship to hold with regard to the di¤erence in alternatives' stand-alone values. Moreover, we hypothesize that for a given relative riskiness of alternative B (proxied by m B or d min ) the number of B-choices is higher the higher the relative payo¤ dominance of alternative B.
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We ran two sessions of a paper-and-pencil experiment at the Georg-August University of Göttingen in February, 2009. In both experimental sessions together there were 153 participants, all of them were economics students. 25 We excluded from the analysis the questionnaires of …ve participants, whose answers were incomplete.
In the following, we analyze the decisions of the remaining 148 participants. Each session of an experiment was conducted at the end of a lecture.
Students were free to leave the auditorium or to stay and to participate in the experiment.
The experimental instructions were read aloud to guarantee that all the participants know that the conditions of the experiment are common knowledge. 26 After the instructions were read the participants could ask questions which were answered individually. 27 In each of the two sessions all the participants had to provide their answers in all the 16 decision situations. 28, 29 In every session there were several groups of 17 participants. All the participants of a given session were sitting in the same room. In each session only the answers 2 5 The number of participants was almost equal in the two sessions.
2 6 See Appendix A for the Instructions.
2 7 We did not run any training session before the experiment, which is an obvious limitation of a paper-andpencil experiment. However, we presented an example of a technology adoption game, which showed how the individual payo¤ of a participant depends on his own choice and the choices of the other participants.
2 8 We implemented a within-subject design with repeated observations for each participant.
2 9 The decision situations were presented to participants in an order di¤erent from the one in which they are given in Appendix B. The decision situations were presented to all the participants in the same order. We did not want to e¤ect participants'choices by ordering the decision situations in a way in which the in ‡uence of either the critical mass or payo¤ dominance on their choices would be likely. The former would be the case if the decision situations of one block were placed according to alternative B's critical mass from the smallest to the largest.
Hence, we did not place the decision situations of one block next to each other. To exclude the in ‡uence of payo¤ dominance we avoided placing the decision situations with the same critical mass of alternative B (but various di¤erences in alternatives'maximal payo¤s) next to each other.
of one group whose members were randomly chosen from the total number of participants of the session were considered for the …nal payment. 30 We analyzed that group's answers in a preselected decision situation (decision situation 2). 31 The analysis took place at the end of the session after all the session's participants had handed in their answers. 32 However, not all the members of a randomly chosen group were paid. Out of those 17 participants only one was randomly chosen for the …nal payment. 33 We used the conversion rate: 1 …ctitious unit equals 50 Euro-Cent. In the …rst session the randomly chosen participant got 83:00 Euro and in the second the payment was 114:00 Euro.
Experimental Results
As one may expect from experiments conducted by van Huyck et al. (1990, 1991 ) disequilibrium outcomes prevail. Table 2 presents the total number of A-choices and B-choices in the 16 decision situations. The highest share an alternative achieved is 60% which is the share of alternative A in the decision situation 14. We observe that in most decision situations the number of B-choices is smaller than the number of A-choices. Only in the decision situations 1 and 6 the number of B-choices is larger. The average share of B-choices is 45%, while the average share of A-choices is 55%.
Our next observation is that an increase in alternative B's relative payo¤ dominance tends to increase the number of B-choices. In Table 2 we keep in each block the critical mass constant, while within each block d max decreases and takes the values 75, 55, 51, and 46. From Table 2 we observe that in each block the number of B-choices tends to fall from the left to the right.
In blocks 1 and 4 the number of B-choices decreases monotonically when d max becomes smaller, whereas blocks 2 and 3 exhibit some irregularities.
In Table 3 we have re-arranged the columns of Table 2 such that each block represents a di¤erent value of d max , while within each block the critical mass increases from 9, to 10, to 11, and …nally, to 12. From Table 3 we observe that in every block the number of B-choices almost monotonically decreases as the critical mass of alternative B increases from 9 up to 12. We conclude that the number of B-choices (A-choices) tends to decrease (increase) as m B increases.
We next present the results of the regression analysis where we analyze the joint in ‡uence of payo¤ dominance and riskiness on participants'choices.
Result 1. Payo¤ dominance of alternative B proxied by the relative di¤ erence in maximal payo¤ s and its riskiness proxied by the relative di¤ erence in critical masses jointly explain participants' choices. Table 4 presents the results of a Logit regression-1 with the probability of a B-choice as a dependant variable. 34 We considered several speci…cations for the explanatory variables. 35 We …nally decided to proxy the relative payo¤ dominance of alternative B by the ratio of the di¤erence in maximal payo¤s to alternative B'maximal payo¤; i.e., d max =U max B . 36 Similarly, we proxy the relative riskiness of alternative B with the ratio of the di¤erence in critical masses to alternative B's critical mass; i.e., [m B m A ] =m B . Those speci…cations yield the most signi…cant results. Intuitively, the reason may be twofold. First, relative di¤erences better mirror the advantage of one alternative over the other than absolute di¤erences. Second, a "normalization" with regard to the payo¤-dominant alternative B can be due to the fact that participants evaluate the alternatives relative to the payo¤-dominant alternative which appears to be most attractive at …rst sight. Table 4 shows that both the relative payo¤ dominance of alternative B and its relative riskiness in ‡uence participants' choices. The regression results imply that the number of Bchoices increases when the relative payo¤ dominance of alternative B increases. The respective parameter estimate is signi…cant at the 1% signi…cance level. Our proxy for the riskiness of alternative B is negatively correlated with the number of B-choices. The respective parameter estimate is signi…cant at the 10%-signi…cance level.
Result 2. Payo¤ dominance of alternative B proxied by the relative di¤ erence in maximal payo¤ s and its riskiness proxied by the relative di¤ erence in minimal payo¤ s jointly explain 3 4 Probit regression delivers even more signi…cant results such that the coe¢ cient capturing the in ‡uence of risk dominance is signi…cant at the 5% signi…cance level. The results of a probit regression are available from the authors on request. Note: Signi…cance levels are: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
participants' choices.
In Table 5 we present the parameters of the Logit regression-2 explaining the probability of choosing alternative B. 37 Table 5 shows that both the relative di¤erence in maximal payo¤s as well as the relative di¤erence in minimal payo¤s of the alternatives explain participants' choices of alternative B. Again, the larger the relative di¤erence in the maximal payo¤s, the more participants choose alternative B. The respective parameter estimate is signi…cant at the 1% signi…cance level. We also see that an increase of the relative di¤erence in the minimal payo¤s reduces the number of B-choices. The respective parameter estimate is signi…cant at the 5% signi…cance level. When we compare Table 5 with Table 4 (where we used the relative di¤erence in alternatives'critical masses as an explanatory variable), we see that the "maximin" speci…cation performs better in terms of the signi…cance level of the parameter estimates. We speculate that the maximin criterion is easier to apply than to calculate a critical mass as it only requires to compare safe payo¤s (i.e., the minimal payo¤s of each alternative). In other words, the critical mass seems to be a more sophisticated concept for participants than the maximin criterion.
We can summarize our experimental results now as follows. First, both payo¤ dominance and riskiness together explain the aggregate choices of participants. Second, to proxy the alternative's riskiness both alternatives'critical masses and minimal payo¤s can be used. The payo¤ dominance and risk dominance re…nements choose one of the two alternatives with probability Note: Signi…cance levels are: *** 1%, ** 5%.
one. Our results suggest that participants resolve the trade-o¤ between payo¤ dominance and risk dominance di¤erently, so that in the aggregate changes in the relative riskiness and the relative payo¤ dominance of alternatives a¤ect participants'choices only at the margin. This can explain why in our experiment minimal payo¤s better explain participants' choices than critical masses. Second, in their experiment decision situations were displayed on a screen ordered by the coordination requirement. Our experiment instead placed all decision situations in the questionnaire in the order such that participants were not explicitly framed to follow threshold strategies. 38 We …nally note that our results stand in contrast to Schmidt et al. (2003) who showed within their setting that participants'choices were a¤ected by changes in the proxy for risk dominance, but not in the proxy for payo¤ dominance.
In a technology adoption game in which N 2 identical users choose simultaneously between two technologies that exhibit positive network e¤ects a coordination problem arises. That game has two strong Nash equilibria in pure strategies where users coordinate on one of the technologies.
One of those equilibria is assumed to be payo¤-dominant. We introduced the heuristic concept of a critical mass which we de…ned as the minimum share of users adopting a technology necessary to make the choice of this technology a best response for any remaining user. We showed that the technology with a lower critical mass is risk-dominant in the sense of Harsanyi and Selten (1988) and is chosen by the maximin criterion. Our critical mass heuristic is, therefore, theoretically instructive as it provides a new way to interpret risk dominance.
In the experimental part we analyzed participants' choices in a technology adoption game which implies a trade-o¤ between risk dominance and payo¤ dominance such that the payo¤-dominant alternative has a larger critical mass. The data shows that participants'choices depend on relative payo¤ dominance and relative riskiness. We proxy the alternative's relative payo¤ dominance by the di¤erence in maximal payo¤s relative to the payo¤ of the payo¤-dominant alternative. With regard to relative riskiness we found that the di¤erence in critical masses or stand-alone values (both relative to the payo¤-dominant alternative) do both explain the outcomes of our experiment. Our results reveal that an alternative is more likely to be chosen when its relative payo¤ dominance (riskiness) increases (decreases).
There are many possible directions for further experimental research. First, it would be insightful to run an experiment with di¤erent group sizes. It is known from the previous research that group size is an important factor determining successful coordination. With a larger group size the role of riskiness on participants' choices may become more signi…cant. Second, it is interesting to analyze the technology adoption game in a repeated setting. Our concept of the critical mass seems to be instructive in the repeated setting too. An alternative with a low critical mass is likely to have an advantage in the beginning. As the game proceeds, one may expect that participants'ability to coordinate their choices increases, which should reduce the importance of riskiness for participants'choices.
Appendix A
In this Appendix we present the English translation of the instructions to our experiment which were handed out in German. The …ctitious monetary units will be converted into Euro for one randomly chosen experiment participant such that one monetary unit will be worth 50 Euro-Cent. Before the Experiment we have chosen one of the 16 decision situations, the number of this decision situation is kept in an envelope. At the end of the experiment …rst a group of 17 participants will be randomly picked up, whose decisions in this decision situation will be analyzed. From this group then one participant will be randomly chosen for the cash payment. Please notice that in the left upper corner of this page as well as on the attached sheet you …nd your individual participation number. We ask you to keep the attached sheet with which we can identify you for the possible cash payment.
Instructions
Every decision situation will be presented in a We ask you now to analyze the following decision situations and mark your choices, alternative X or Y . For this you …nd a box under every decision situation.
When all the experiment participants are ready with their choices, we will collect the questionnaires and establish the person who will be paid in cash.
Appendix B
In this Appendix we present decision situations in which the participants had to make their choices. On the top of each decision situation table we also provide the underlying utility functions (which we did not present to participants), U A (N A ) and U B (N B ), from which we calculated the (rounded) payo¤s stated in the tables. The decision situations were placed in a random order in the questionnaire. We presented two decision situations on a single sheet of paper. In the questionnaire we also re-labeled the alternatives such that an alternative could be either labelled as "X" or "Y ". 
Decision Situation

